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An efficient housing market is of critical importance for individual 
welfare and for a well-functioning economy. We test the efficiency of this market 
by estimating the factors that determine both the long-run and the dynamic paths 
of regional house prices. Our tests use a new quarterly regional panel data set 
covering the 14 regions of New Zealand from 1981 to 2002. The tests indicate that 
regional housing markets converge to an equilibrium consistent with consumer 
optimising conditions, and hence with long-run efficiency. However, some 
conditions required for short-run (dynamic) efficiency are violated. We find that 
extrapolative price expectations, based on past regional phenomena, lead to 
overshooting of house prices in response to new region-specific information. We 
also find that price dynamics are influenced by past regional house sales activity 
and that the dynamic adjustment process is asymmetric depending on whether 
house prices are above or below their long-run equilibrium. 
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 1 Introduction 
An efficient housing market is of critical importance for individual 
welfare and for a well-functioning economy (Di, 2001; Bajari and Kahn, 2003).
  
Long-run efficiency requires that house prices converge to a relationship 
determined by consumers' optimising conditions. Short-run efficiency requires 
prices to adjust quickly to new information so that excess profit opportunities, 
after deducting trading costs, do not linger in the market. 
We test for long-run and short-run efficiency of the housing market, as 
reflected in house prices. Our tests indicate that regional housing markets 
converge to an equilibrium consistent with long-run efficiency. However, some 
conditions required for short-run efficiency are violated. In particular, we find that 
extrapolative price expectations, based on past regional phenomena, lead to 
overshooting of house prices in response to new region-specific information. 
Further, price dynamics are influenced by past regional house sales activity. 
Notably, the dynamic adjustment process is asymmetric depending on whether 
house prices are above or below their long-run equilibrium. Thus the degree of 
short-run efficiency is affected by the nature of a shock's impact (upwards or 
downwards) on the equilibrium price. 
Our tests use a new regional panel data set covering the 14 regions of 
New  Zealand over 88 quarters [1981(1)–2002(4)]. This dataset includes the 
median sales price of owner-occupied dwellings, the ratio of the dwelling's sales 
price to its official valuation (used for property tax purposes), and the number of 
sales in each quarter. We use this data in conjunction with other relevant regional 
data to test the efficiency properties of the housing market. The sales data enables 
us to test for sales-driven "fad" (or other) effects that existing studies either cannot 
test or have to test using inadequate proxies. Our finding that sales activity has a 
material, but asymmetric, effect on house price dynamics adds to current 
understanding of the nature of property market dynamics. 
 
1 We illustrate our key findings relating to inefficiency of house price 
dynamics through simulated house price paths in response to certain economic 
and financial shocks. Plausible economic developments, based on recent historical 
experience, indicate the potential for material house price overshooting. 
House prices summarise a large amount of information regarding the 
desirability and cost of living in a particular location (MacDonald and Taylor, 
1993; Case and Mayer, 1996; Sheppard, 1999; Cook, 2003) and influence 
migration patterns (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001). Recent studies have cast doubt 
on the efficiency of this market. For instance, Capozza and Seguin (1996) find 
evidence of euphoria in metro house markets, while Case and Shiller (1988, 1989, 
2003) find evidence of predictability in regional house prices that should not exist 
in an efficient market. Inefficiency in such a critical market may have important 
welfare consequences and may cause financial imbalances, especially following 
the bursting of a bubble, with material macroeconomic consequences.
1
Case and Shiller (2003) define a housing bubble as "a situation in which 
excessive public expectations for future price increases cause prices to be 
temporarily elevated". They postulate that fundamental factors such as income 
growth and interest rates initiate a house price change, but expectations may then 
become self-reinforcing, setting a bubble in train. Their survey-based results 
indicate that house buyers in markets with recent high house price growth build in 
high expected capital gains for the following decade. This behaviour is consistent 
with an expectations-driven bubble. They also produce survey evidence that house 
market adjustment is likely to be asymmetric, with sellers preferring to withdraw 
from the market during a downturn rather than accepting the price consequences 
of selling in those market conditions. By contrast, in an upturn, house prices 
respond rapidly, albeit being curtailed longer term by new house construction. 
                                                           
1 Concerns over such issues led The Economist magazine to devote its 31 May 2003 survey of 
property to this topic under the title "Close to bursting". 
2 This paper builds on these insights, presenting a systematic examination 
of the sources of potential inefficiencies in regional housing markets. We estimate 
the factors which determine both the long-run and dynamic paths of regional 
house prices. We do so by adopting an optimising model of house price 
determination, which we use to estimate long-run house price determinants. 
Expectations are a key factor in this formulation. We then estimate clearly 
specified dynamic models, and test whether certain features discussed by Case 
and Shiller (1989, 2003) and others influence the dynamic behaviour of the 
housing market. These features may push prices temporarily away from 
equilibrium. Our analysis is at a regional level and incorporates both regional and 
national variables, as appropriate, within a panel cointegration framework. This 
approach complements the survey-based and single equation approaches of Case 
and Shiller (1989, 2003). By testing hypotheses within a rigorous theoretical and 
econometric framework, and with an alternative dataset incorporating sales 
variables not available to previous researchers, we are able to shed considerable 
light on the (efficient and inefficient) behaviour of the housing market. 
The questions we address in order to assess long run and short run 
efficiency, include: Are prices in the long term driven by factors identified 
through a consumer optimization problem? Do expectations-driven fads have an 
impact and, if so, are these fads driven by regional or national developments? 
Does regional sales activity have an effect in fuelling regional fads, or is sales 
activity a stabilising factor driving prices towards equilibrium? Do the dynamic 
adjustment mechanisms incorporate non-linearities which may indicate 
information-based reasons for variations in price adjustment towards long run 
equilibrium? Do significant adjustment asymmetries exist and, if so, what do 
these asymmetries indicate about the nature of fads or related phenomena? 
3 We address this set of questions using a new, consistently measured 
quarterly panel dataset for New  Zealand.
  The country has a population of 4 
million people spread over two main islands. With a combined land area similar to 
that of Japan or the United Kingdom, it is divided into 14 regions corresponding 
to Regional Councils.
2 Regional Council boundaries follow physical features—
primarily major water catchments—so regions tend to be distinct economic 
entities; for instance, individual cities do not flow over council boundaries.
3
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical basis 
for our long-run model and explicitly formulates the long-run and dynamic 
models to be tested. Data is described in Section 3, and estimation results are 
presented in Section 4. Interpretation of the dynamic results, focusing especially 
on the effects of capital gains expectations, sales activity and asymmetric 
adjustment processes on house price dynamics, is presented in Section 5. Section 
6 presents a brief conclusion, with pointers to future work. 
2 Theoretical  model 
Our theoretical approach to estimating regional house prices builds on 
the work of Pain and Westaway (1996), who formulated an optimising model to 
determine equilibrium house prices. We use this model as a basis for examining 
long-run efficiency of the housing market. We then incorporate error correction 
and dynamic adjustment aspects introduced by Capozza et al (2002) plus 
additional dynamic adjustment features to investigate aspects of short-run 
efficiency discussed above. 
                                                           
2 There are 16 Regional Councils but, in keeping with our data sources, we amalgamate 3 small 
neighbouring councils into one (Nelson-Marlborough-Tasman). 
3 The physical distinctiveness of regions is reflected in the finding that New Zealand house prices 
do not share a single common trend, so national variables alone cannot explain regional house 
price developments (Grimes et al, 2003). 
4 2.1 Long-run  model 
Pain and Westaway formulate the consumer problem as one where each 
household allocates its lifetime wealth over consumption of housing services (c
h; 
proxied by a constant, θ, multiplied by the housing stock, h) and non-housing 
consumption (c) in each period of life and over its bequest. Use of a constant 
relative risk aversion utility function (with coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ) 
and aggregating over individuals results in the optimising equation explaining 
equilibrium real house prices (g) in (1): 
  ln(g) = (1 – γ)ln(θ) – γln(h) + γln(c) – ln(UC)  (1) 
where: 
•  g  is the ratio of quality-adjusted price of housing (p
h) to the price of 
non-housing consumption goods (p
c) 
•  h  is the housing stock 
•  c  is non-housing consumption 
•  UC  is the real user cost of capital (discussed further below). 
If c is unobservable (as it is with the regional data at our disposal), we 
can add an auxiliary hypothesis that c is determined as in (2): 
 ln(c)  =  α + βln(y) (2) 
where: y is an appropriate activity variable influencing regional non-
housing consumption.
4
                                                           
4 Note that c represents aggregate non-housing consumption, so y represents aggregate economic 
activity; no additional demographic scalar is required. If we were to make c also a function of UC 
in (2), it would not alter the nature of our final estimating equations, although interpretation of the 
UC coefficient would differ. (2) and subsequent equations also include error terms; these are 
assumed to have standard properties, but are suppressed for expositional purposes. 
5 House prices are observed for bundles of housing and related 
services.
5,6 If (as in our case) house sales price data are not quality adjusted, we 
can add another auxiliary hypothesis linking the real unadjusted sales price (p
u/p
c) 





c) + ξZ (3) 
where: Z is a vector of house-specific and locality-specific attributes 
and ξ is an accompanying coefficient vector. Combining (1)–(3) yields: 
 ln(p
u/p
c) = δ – γln(h) + βγln(y) – ln(UC) + ξZ (4) 
where: δ = [(1 – γ)ln(θ) + αγ]. 
2.2  Issues in implementing the long-run model 
The stock of housing (h) in each area is determined jointly with house 
prices in the long run. The rate of change in the stock of houses will be influenced 
by factors such as costs of constructing new houses, the degree of vacant land 
available for housing and regulatory efficiency (Capozza et al, 2002; Case and 
Mayer, 1996; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002). The housing stock changes only 
slowly over time and so can be considered a predetermined variable over short to 
medium time horizons. By contrast, the house price is an asset price and so is a 
"jump" variable, reflecting the influence of new information. We can therefore 
estimate (4) and identify the effect of changes in each of h, y and UC on long-run 
real house prices.
7
                                                           
5 House-specific services have been proxied elsewhere through: number of bathrooms, lot size, 
fireplace, garage size, air-conditioning, basement, detached dwelling, patio and previous dwelling 
purchase price (Can, 1992; Dubin, 1992; Genesove and Mayer, 2001). 
6 Housing services also include amenity and location values, which have been proxied elsewhere 
through: neighbourhood quality index, land supply index, coastal situation, distance from city 
centre, school assessment scores, crime rate, per capita income and unemployment rate (Can, 
1992; Capozza et al, 2002; Case and Mayer, 1996; Dubin, 1992; O'Donovan and Rae, 1997). 
7 Eventually h will adjust, so the long-run system-wide effect of a change in each explanatory 
variable on house prices has to incorporate the housing stock response. O'Donovan and Rae (1997) 
found that single equation estimates of aggregate New Zealand house prices gave very similar 
results to full system estimates, which included equations also for consumption and for housing 
investment. 
6 The variables which enter Z may include some that are fixed over time 
but which vary cross-sectionally (e.g. latitude of the locality) and others which 
vary over time (e.g. changing house quality or changing amenities within a 
locality). The former set can be handled through the inclusion of fixed effects. The 
latter require region-specific proxies. These quality and amenity variables are 
likely to be slowly changing over time (e.g. the process of "gentrification" of an 
area, or changing attitudes towards a coastal location). If (as in our case) there is 
no comprehensive data to proxy for the latter elements of Z, we can capture the 
influence of these variables through inclusion of a quadratic time trend, with 
coefficients that are freely estimated for each region reflecting trends in region-
specific attributes. Thus, if the quality of residential houses in one region is 
trending upwards relative to another region, the quadratic time trend can account 
for this and other (quadratically) trending factors.
8
A key variable in (4) is UC, the real user cost of capital. In formulating 
this variable we note that, in New Zealand, owner-occupiers' mortgage interest 
payments are not tax deductible, nor are capital gains from housing taxed. If loan 
finance is the marginal source of finance for housing then there is no tax relief on 
the housing loan and no tax to pay on the housing services. Thus no tax rate 
should appear in the UC variable.
9
The relevant real user cost facing a house purchaser is the real interest 
rate, r,
10 less the expected annual real capital gain on the house, ġ. The real 
interest rate is identical across regions in any given quarter, but ġ may not be. As 
discussed by Case and Shiller (2003), the nature of capital gains expectation 
formation is of importance to any fad or overshooting effect. 
                                                           
8 By restricting our attention solely to residential houses, we avoid change in housing quality 
caused by a shift from detached dwellings to apartments. In our dynamic equations, changes in 
composition of houses sold each quarter are also accounted for. 
9 If, however, other taxable investment opportunities constitute the marginal source of finance for 
funding house purchase then the tax rate should enter into UC, since the opportunity cost is taxed. 
Also, housing investors' interest payments are tax deductible. This leads to the problem that 
different investors face different tax rates and the relationship of these tax rates to each other has 
varied over time. Entering a single tax rate would not adequately capture the taxation effect for 
different individuals. 
10 We proxy r by the 90-day bank bill yield less the latest CPI inflation rate, each expressed in 
annual terms. Grimes (1994) finds that mortgage interest rates are set as a margin above the 90-day 
bank bill yield; the margin is incorporated into the equation constant. 
7 The more backward looking expectations are, the more likely it is that 
prices can overshoot their fundamental values in response to a change in 
fundamental factors. We test four alternative proxies for ġ. 
First, building on O'Donovan and Rae's (1997) nationwide analysis of 
the New Zealand housing market, we set ġ equal to the past three years' annual 
real capital gain on houses at the national level.
11 The three-year horizon reflects 
expectations based on the medium-term national trend in real prices. We call the 
resulting user cost variable UC1. Given its construction, it is identical across 
regions in any given quarter. 
Second, we set ġ equal to the past three years' annual real capital gain 
on houses at the regional level. The resulting user cost variable, UC2, differs 
across regions in any given quarter. 
Third, we set ġ equal to the past year's annual real capital gain on 
houses at the regional level. The one-year horizon reflects expectations driven by 
shorter term factors, consistent with Case and Shiller's (1989) finding that one 
year's house price changes help predict the next year's price change. The resulting 
user cost variable, UC3, also differs across regions in any given quarter. 
Fourth, we set ġ equal to zero, allowing the equation constant to proxy 
for a constant real capital gain expectation over time. We denote this variable as 
UC4. If there is no backward-looking element in expectations, this proxy should 
perform better than each of the other three proxies. 
As in O'Donovan and Rae (1997), we note that each of the four 
alternative proxies approaches zero, and at times becomes negative during our 
sample. This makes it impossible to include ln(UC) as specified in (4). Instead, we 
include UC with a freely estimated coefficient. 
                                                           
11 We take the average of the first and fourth years in constructing this variable to reduce noise. 
For instance, the 1985(1) observation is calculated as the annual rate of change between calendar 
1981 and calendar 1984 average real house prices. 
8 Another complication with UC in the New  Zealand context is that 
interest rates were strictly controlled until 1984 by government regulation and are 
unlikely at that stage to have equilibrated the credit market. (The shadow cost of 
credit is likely to have been considerably above the actual interest rate, reflecting 
excess demand at the regulated rate.) To account for this factor, we enter UC 
starting from 1985(1), and supplement it with the inclusion of a dummy variable 
(UCD) taking the value of 1 prior to 1985(1) and 0 thereafter. 
Taking each of the above factors into account, the long-run estimating 
equation for each region corresponding to our theoretical specification (using 
subsequent data terminology, with time subscript t) is:  




•  Pz  is the log of the real median residential house sales price in region 
z [corresponding to ln(p
u/p
c)] 
•  Yz  is the log of real regional economic activity for region z 
[corresponding to ln(y)] 
•  Hz  is the log of the residential house stock in region z [corresponding 
to ln(h)] 
•  UCxz  is the real user cost of capital (x = 1, 2, 3, 4 as described 
above) 
•  UCD  is a dummy variable = 1 prior to 1985(1), 0 thereafter 
•  TIME  is a linear time trend 
•  TIME
2  is the linear time trend squared. 
a0z–a6z are coefficients with a1z, a2z, a3z and a4z each constrained to be 
identical across regions, reflecting the coefficients in (4); a0z, a5z and a6z are 
coefficients that reflect fixed and region-specific trend effects and so differ across 
regions. 
9 For our estimates to be consistent with long-run market efficiency, (5) 
has to be a valid long-run equation across all regions. As discussed below, the 
stochastic variables included in (5) are non-stationary [I(1)]. A requirement for (5) 
to be a valid long-run equation, and hence for the equation to be consistent with 
long-run efficiency holding, is that the residual from (5) is stationary; if this were 
not the case, real house prices would not return to the consumer's optimising 
conditions following a shock. In particular, we require the residual to be stationary 
when a1z, a2z, a3z and a4z are each restricted to be identical across regions, since in 
each case the relevant coefficient reflects underlying parameter(s) that are 
hypothesised to be identical across regions. 
2.3 Dynamic  model 
Market efficiency is most often tested through examination of price 
dynamics (Fama and French, 1988; Case and Shiller, 1989; Capozza & Seguin, 
1996). As Capozza and Seguin demonstrate, however, short-run market efficiency 
cannot be tested solely through an examination of house price dynamics, since 
rentals also form part of the return to housing. Without information on rentals, we 
cannot interpret directly whether the dynamics of house prices are consistent with 
a no arbitrage condition. 
Instead, we focus on the speed and nature of the adjustment of house 
prices to long-run equilibrium, defined in (5), noting—to anticipate the empirical 
results—that (5) passes the tests to be considered a valid long-run specification of 
house prices. In a perfectly flexible market with zero transactions costs and no 
information costs, house prices should adjust immediately to their long-run values 
consequent on a change in one or more of the explanatory variables in (5). Even if 
this were the case, stochastic errors could cause temporary deviations in the house 
price from long-run equilibrium, but in an efficient market these deviations should 
be fully unwound in the subsequent quarter. 
10 These conditions can be specified within an error correction framework. 
Denote the equilibrium value of the log of the real unadjusted long-run house 
price [from (5)] as P*zt, and consider the error correction equation (6): 
  ∆Pzt = b1z∆P*zt + b2z(Pzt–1 – P*zt–1) + b3z∆Pzt–1 + b4zXzt (6) 
Inclusion of ∆Pzt–1, the lagged change in real house prices, allows for a 
partial adjustment mechanism.
12 Xzt is a vector of other stationary variables that 
may potentially impact on the dynamics of real house prices in region z. Short-run 
market efficiency, as discussed above, requires b1z = 1 for all z, b2z = –1 for all z, 
b3z = 0 for all z, and b4z = 0 for all elements of X and all z.
13
The specification in (6) is appropriate for an environment of costless 
information dissemination about fundamentals.
 Capozza et al (2002) examine the 
case where increased housing market activity improves information dissemination 
about the market price (and quality) of houses. In this imperfect information world 
the adjustment coefficients, b1z and b2z in (6), may themselves be a function of 
housing market activity. Our house sales data corresponds to a direct measure of 
housing market activity, unlike Capozza et al who did not have a direct proxy for 
such activity. Building on their approach, we model this imperfect information 
environment by allowing the serial correlation and reversion parameters in the 
dynamic equation for each region to be functions of a housing market activity 
variable specific to a region as in (7): 
∆Pzt = b1z∆P*zt + [b2z+b2Az(Azt – Ā)]( Pzt–1 – P*zt–1) + [b3z + b3Az(Azt – Ā)]∆Pzt–1  
+ b4zXzt (7)
                                                           
12 The relative values of b1z, b2z and b3z in each region determine the degree of lagged adjustment 
and/or overshooting behaviour relative to fundamentals. Capozza et al (2002) demonstrate that as 
the serial correlation coefficient, b3z, increases, the amplitude and persistence of house price cycles 
tends to increase. As the absolute value of the reversion coefficient, b2z, increases, the frequency 
and amplitude of the cycle tends to increase. 
13 A single exception to the latter requirement in our estimated equation is a freely estimated 
coefficient on a variable (COMP) which accounts for short-term measured price changes due to 
changing composition of house sales between quarters within each region. For instance, if a higher 
ratio of "good" houses sells in one quarter than in the previous quarter, we would expect to see 
measured sale prices rise (temporarily) from one quarter to the next. 
11 In (7), Az is an independent variable influencing adjustment of house 
prices in each region and Ā represents the mean value of Az. In this specification, 
for instance, a region that has a value of Azt greater than Ā will have faster 
reversion of prices to fundamentals than the mean speed of reversion if b2Az is 
negative. 
In operationalising (7), there is an issue as to whether the mean value 
(Ā) should be time invariant as postulated by Capozza et al. For variables that are 
trending over time, this specification would imply a gradual raising or lowering of 
the partial adjustment and reversion parameters. In some cases this may be 
economically sensible but in others it will not be. We consider that the most 
robust way of specifying the Az variable is to choose a form of the variable which 
does not trend significantly over the sample period, so that the sample mean is a 
stable baseline against which to measure deviation of actual movements from the 
norm. Our measure of Az is the ratio of house sales to the housing stock in each 
region.
14 If sales rise, we hypothesise that there will be improved information 
dissemination; hence we expect b2Az ≤ 0, which corresponds to faster reversion to 
long-run equilibrium (where –1 < b2z < 0). If sales activity coupled with lagged 
price changes incorporates new and/or improved information, we would expect 
b3Az  ≥ 0. Interpretation of these coefficients will indicate whether market 
efficiency is affected by information disseminated through house sales activity. 
Sales activity should have no effect additional to that specified in (7) in 
an efficient market (i.e. if it is entered as a component of Xzt, its coefficient should 
be zero). However, it may be, as suggested by Case and Shiller (1989), that sales 
activity does affect price dynamics independently of the information reasons just 
outlined. To test if this is the case, we add current and lagged sales activity 
independently to the equation (affecting the constant term) as in (8). In (8) the 
current and lagged activity variables test whether sales activity has an independent 
effect on price adjustment over and above the interaction terms in (7). 
                                                           
14 Capozza et al used population as an imperfect proxy for sales. However, house sales are more 
likely to capture dynamic effects than is a slow-moving variable such as population. We also have 
data (albeit for only half the full period) for building consents, reflecting forthcoming house 
construction activity. However, the partial coverage of this variable meant it was not statistically 
significant when included in our work and we do not discuss its role further here. 
12   ∆Pzt = b1z∆P*zt + [b2z + b2Az(Azt – Ā)]( Pzt–1 – P*zt–1) + [b3z + b3Az(Azt – Ā)]∆Pzt–1 
+ b4zXzt + Σib5izAzt–i (8) 
The vector, Xzt, now excludes sales activity. It remains the case that 
short-run efficiency requires b4z = 0 and b5iz = 0 for all i. 
Our final test of the dynamic structure of house prices is a test for 
asymmetric adjustment depending on whether the previous quarter's actual prices 
are above or below fundamentals. Glaeser and Gyourko (2001), Cook (2003) and 
Case and Shiller (2003) all indicate the potential importance of asymmetric 
adjustment for the dynamics of the housing market. If regional housing demand 
expands, say in response to an increase in regional economic activity, prices are 
expected to rise from (5) but housing supply (h) will also expand gradually over 
time. By contrast, if regional housing demand falls, housing supply is unlikely to 
contract materially other than through depreciation (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001). 
The effects of these asymmetric factors on expectations may be reflected in 
asymmetric adjustment to equilibrium in the two situations, with prices reacting 
more strongly to a fall in equilibrium prices than to a rise. Another cause of 
asymmetry (working in the opposite direction) may be reluctance by previous 
buyers to experience a realised capital loss in situations where prices have fallen. 
Sales may reduce in such circumstances without a significant observed price fall 
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001). 
We test whether coefficients in (8) are identical when the sample is split 
into two categories: Pzt–1 > P*zt–1 and Pzt–1 < P*zt–1. If identical, then adjustment is 
symmetric; otherwise asymmetric adjustment is indicated. Asymmetric 
adjustment may indicate inefficiencies under some market conditions, as in the 
“reluctant-seller” (Genesove and Mayer) case cited above. Interpretation of the 
coefficients in the split sample will yield insights into what is driving any 
asymmetry. 
13 3 Data 
We use Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) data for median 
residential house sale prices in each region. QVNZ is a state-owned entity that 
collects data on all house sales and which also values properties for local authority 
property tax purposes. We have measures, from this source, of the number of 
house sales in each region, the QVNZ valuation of houses that are sold, and the 
median sales price. Each of these variables is used in the estimation in Section 4. 
In order to compare "like with like" as much as possible, we restrict our attention 
to the residential house market, which excludes all multi-unit residential sales and 
all non-residential transactions. All data is available quarterly from 1981(1) –
2002(4). These data, together with data for the regional housing stock, are 
described in detail in Grimes et al (2003). That paper also presents tests for 
bivariate cointegration between regional house price levels and bivariate 
contemporaneous correlation between regional house price changes. These tests 
indicate that while house prices are cointegrated for some regional pairs they are 
more frequently not cointegrated. A little over half the contemporaneous 
correlations are significant at the 5% level. Together, these results indicate some 
similarity in house price developments nationally, but also reveal material 
elements of regional diversity.
15
Regions are denoted RC01-RC15 (there is no region 10); RC01-RC09
16 
are in the North Island, RC11-RC15
17 are in the South Island. Table 1 lists key 
characteristics of the data for each region. Column 1 presents the median nominal 
sales price for the 2002 calendar year, demonstrating that the median price in 
Auckland (RC02), New Zealand's largest city, was 4.5 times that in the (rural) 
West Coast of the South Island (RC12). Column 2 presents the change in real 
sales price between 1981 and 2002 (i.e. after deflating the median sales price by 
the consumers price index, CPI). 
                                                           
15 Grimes et al also conduct Granger causality tests on regional house prices for all regional 
pairings, in both directions. Three-quarters of the 182 tests are not significant at the 10% level, 
implying that spatial autocorrelation is not material at the regional council level. 
16 Northland, Auckland, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, Hawke's Bay, Taranaki, Manawatu-
Wanganui and Wellington respectively. 
17 Nelson-Marlborough-Tasman, West Coast, Canterbury, Otago and Southland respectively. 
14 Real prices in Southland (RC15) fell by 27% over this period, while 
those in Gisborne (RC05) were virtually unchanged; both regions are 
predominantly rural with no city having a population in excess of 47,000. By 
contrast, real prices in Auckland more than doubled and those in Wellington 
(RC09), the capital city, almost doubled. The average number of quarterly sales 
throughout the sample for each region is shown in column 3; column 4 lists the 
population of each region at the 2001 census; column 5 presents population 
density at the 2001 census. 
In order to proxy real regional economic activity (Yzt), we use the 
logarithm of the National Bank of New  Zealand Regional Economic Activity 
indices (National Bank of New Zealand, 2003). Column 6 of Table 1 indicates the 
percentage change between 1981 and 2002 in this variable for each region. As 
with previous columns, considerable divergence in regional performance is 
indicated. Growth in the fastest growing region (Northland, RC01) was over three 
times that in Gisborne (RC05). A comparison of columns 2 and 6 indicates that 
fast-growing regions tended to have faster-growing real house prices; the (cross-
sectional) correlation between the two columns is 0.72. 
In the dynamic equations we need to account for changes in the 
composition of houses sold within a region in a particular quarter. To do so, we 
use the QVNZ valuation (as opposed to sales price) data for the houses sold in 
each quarter in each region. We form a composition variable, COMPz, which 
takes the ratio of the median valuation of houses sold in a region relative to a 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered series for that region's median house valuation, the latter 
series representing the trend valuation of houses in the region. If the ratio in a 
quarter is greater (less) than one, the median house sold in that quarter is better 
(lower) quality than the average house in that region. Hence this variable should 
enter the dynamic equation with a positive sign.
18 The sales variable, Sz, which we 
enter into the dynamic equation (representing the housing market activity variable, 
Az) is the ratio of house sales to the housing stock in each region. House sales data 
are obtained from QVNZ. 
                                                           
18 This variable is stationary and so does not appear in the long-run equation. 
15 Each of Pz, Yz, Hz and UCxz are tested for non-stationarity using the 
panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2002). We also test COMPz and Sz, which are each included in the dynamic 
specification. Results are presented in Table 2. Where the results of these tests are 
unambiguous (i.e. consistent from the 1% through to the 10% significance level) 
the implied order of integration is indicated in Table 2; ambiguous results are 
shown as I(0)/I(1). 
Each of the variables, other than COMPz, is either unambiguously non-
stationary or else the order of integration cannot be determined with (near) 
certainty. Where a result is ambiguous, we prefer to treat the series as non-
stationary, unless theory suggests that stationarity is more appropriate.
19 Each of 
the stochastic variables in (5) is therefore treated as being I(1).
20 COMPz is clearly 
I(0); Sz is also treated as I(0) since the sales to house stock ratio must be bounded 
above and below, indicating stationarity. 
4 Results 
4.1 Long-run  results 
We estimate (5) using both OLS and SUR, presenting results for each 
estimation method.
21 Initially we estimate the equation with no restrictions. To 
provide a basis for comparison with our subsequent estimates, the Adjusted R
2 
and standard error (s.e.) for the system, using UC2, are 0.9988 and 0.0445 
respectively.
22 The s.e. indicates an average error of 4.5% across the sample, 
which can be compared with an s.e. of 7.9% when the system is estimated with 
just the fixed effects and quadratic time trend terms included. 
We test the system of unrestricted equations for cointegration using the 
group mean panel test of Pedroni (1999).
23  The test statistic is –11.88 against a 
                                                           
 
19 See Banerjee et al (1993). 
20 ADF tests on UC1 and UC4, both national variables, indicate that they are I(1) with drift. 
21 Estimation is done in Stata and in Eviews. The Stata OLS results correspond to the Eviews WLS 
results. The SUR results are identical in each. 
22 As shown in Table 3, UC2 provides the greatest explanatory power of all the UC variables. 
23 This parametric ADF-based test is analogous to the Im et al unit root statistic applied to the 
estimated residuals of a cointegrating regression. The test allows for heterogeneity in both the 
16 critical value of –1.46 indicating that the system of equations is cointegrated. Thus 
the unrestricted estimates are consistent with a valid long-run specification. 
When we restrict each of the coefficients a1z, a2z, a3z and a4z to be 
identical across all regions, the Adjusted R
2 and s.e. for the system are 0.9980 and 
0.0485 respectively, little changed from the unrestricted estimates. Application of 
the Pedroni panel cointegration test yields a test statistic of –8.33 against a critical 
value of –6.28, which indicates that the restricted system is also cointegrated and 
so represents a valid long-run specification for regional house prices. In terms of 
efficiency, this finding implies that the housing market is consistent with long-run 
efficiency, whereby house prices converge to values consistent with consumer 
optimisation. 
Table 3 presents the restricted OLS and SUR system estimates using 
each of UC1–UC4. The results are used to examine the nature of the expectations 
process for house prices. In each case a constant TIME and TIME
2 are included 
unrestricted for each region in addition to the four variables listed, but are not 
reported in the table for clarity.  The Adjusted R
2 and s.e. for the system are 
included for each estimation for comparison purposes. 
The results are similar across the two estimation techniques, and show 
consistency in sign and broad magnitude of coefficients across the different UC 
specifications. However, the explanatory power of the equations differs 
substantially across the different specifications of UC. By far the strongest 
explanatory power comes with UC2, embodying region-specific real capital gains 
expectations based on medium-term (past three-year) developments. 
                                                           
long-run cointegrating vectors as well as heterogeneity in the dynamics associated with short-run 
deviations from these cointegrating vectors. 
17 The s.e. for each of the national specifications and for the one-year 
region-specific specification of UC are all similar, and each is over 10% higher 
than for the corresponding UC2 estimates. The coefficient estimates on UC are 
considerably higher in absolute value for UC2 than for the other UC specifications 
and the significance of those estimates is very much higher than for the other three 
UC specifications. In the dynamic equations that follow, the greatest explanatory 
power is also obtained using UC2 ahead of any of the other UC specifications. We 
therefore restrict our attention to this definition of UC in the remainder of the 
paper. The implications of the three-year region-specific UC specification for 
house price dynamics are analysed in Section 5. 
Restricting attention to the UC2 specification, the elasticity of real 
house prices with respect to regional economic activity is approximately unity 
(0.92 using SUR; 1.17 using OLS). As the housing stock expands, ceteris paribus, 
the real price of housing falls with an elasticity of approximately two-thirds. Each 
of these estimates appears intuitively reasonable.
24 In most regions, the coefficient 
on TIME is positive while the coefficient on TIME
2 is negative. At the end of the 
sample, the combined coefficient effect of TIME and TIME
2 on Pz was positive in 
ten of the fourteen regions. 
A one percentage point increase in the real user cost of capital is 
estimated to reduce the long-run real house price by between three-quarters of one 
per cent and one per cent. Given that the real user cost of capital does not change 
markedly over long periods, the long-run upward trend in real house prices in 
most regions cannot be attributed to financial factors; rather, the upward trend in 
real house prices is attributable mainly to increases in economic activity and to the 
effects of tastes and other factors proxied by TIME and TIME
2. 
                                                           
24 Compared with the underlying structural parameters in (4), the SUR estimates indicate a CRRA 
(γ) of 0.65 and a consumption elasticity with respect to economic activity (β) of 1.43. As discussed 
in Grimes et al (2003), our measure of the housing stock may involve some inaccuracy which 
could lead to the absolute value of the estimate for γ being understated, and hence to the implied 
estimate for β being overstated. (Any trend error in the housing stock estimate will be 
compensated for by inclusion of the quadratic time trend for each region.) 
18 The positive coefficient on UCD indicates that real house prices were 
higher,  ceteris paribus, before financial deregulation than afterwards. The 
regulated period was one in which real interest rates were frequently negative 
(boosting house prices) while the supply of credit was restricted (reducing house 
prices). The positive coefficient on UCD indicates that the former effect 
outweighed the latter over the 1981–1984 period. 
4.2 Dynamic  results:  Symmetric 
To test short-run efficiency, we start with the symmetric dynamic 
framework in (8) with the interaction terms (b2Az and b3Az) constrained to zero. 
The impact of the interaction terms is tested subsequently. 
Recall that short-run efficiency requires that b1z = 1, b2z = –1, and 
requires all other coefficients, other than the coefficient on COMPzt (accounting 
for the effect of compositional changes in house sales on the measured median 
price), to equal zero. We split ∆P*zt into its individual components (∆Yzt, ∆Hzt, 
∆UC2zt) to test the short-run adjustment speed for each of its constituent parts. In 
this case, the requirement that b1z = 1 corresponds to a requirement that the 
coefficients on each of these components equal their long-run counterparts from 
Table 3. 
In the Xzt vector, we include COMPzt, as described above. We also 
include the log change in consumer prices, ∆PCt. Inclusion of this variable allows 
us to test whether aggregate consumer price changes are fully and immediately 
incorporated into regional house price changes. If this is the case, the coefficient 
on ∆PCt will be zero (i.e. b4z = 0).  A coefficient between –1 and 0 indicates some 
measure of partial adjustment of house prices to consumer price changes, in which 
case changes to consumer price inflation will impact temporarily on real house 
prices. 
19 From (8), we include current and lagged sales activity, Szt–i, as our 
measure of housing market activity. This variable tests for "bandwagon" or other 
effects of sales activity on prices that arise separately from the information 
dissemination role of sales posited by Capozza et al. In an efficient market, the 
coefficients on these (current and lagged) sales variables should equal zero. 
In estimating the specification based on (8), the lagged residual was 
highly significant, but no separate partial adjustment process for nominal house 
prices was found significant (i.e. b3z = 0). Thus lagged house price changes (∆Pzt–
1) are omitted from the reported results in Table 4. Cross-equation restrictions are 
again imposed on the system. The resulting OLS equation is presented as column 
(1) in Table 4, where RESt–1 is the lagged residual, using UC2 from the OLS 
equation presented in Table 3. Inspection of the estimates in column (1) reveals a 
number of features that relate to our tests of short-run efficiency. 
First, the coefficient on the lagged residual (b2z) is significantly 
negative; its high t-value (18.73) confirms the cointegration findings from Table 
3, indicating also that the preferred equation from Table 3 is a valid long-run 
equation explaining Pzt. However, the coefficient is significantly different from –
1, with the 95% confidence interval being (–0.48, –0.39). This estimate indicates 
that any deviation in house prices from equilibrium in one period is not fully 
unwound in the subsequent quarter. Further, the coefficients on ∆Yzt and UC2zt 
are well below, and significantly different from, their long-run counterparts; the 
coefficient estimate on ∆PCt (which is significantly different from zero) indicates 
that around half of consumer price inflation is reflected in house prices 
contemporaneously. The only coefficient that is not significantly different to its 
long-run counterpart is that on ∆Hzt. 
Together, these results indicate that we can reject short-run efficiency in 
the sense that prices do not adjust to existing disequilibria or to short-run shocks 
within one quarter. Nevertheless, the adjustment parameters are highly significant 
and indicate that approximately half the adjustment to most shocks occurs within 
a one quarter timeframe. 
20 Thus, heuristically, the degree of short-run inefficiency appears small, 
especially for a market that does not have freely traded liquid securities. 
When including current and lagged sales activity, Szt–i, we tested for 
lags individually and also tested whether a group of current and/or lagged 
variables was significant. When Szt–2 is included, no other lag of sales is 
significant, and Szt–2 always outperformed any other lag of that variable. Thus we 
include Szt-2 as our measure of housing market activity. Its coefficient is 
particularly interesting in terms of testing for short-run efficiency. Commonly, it 
is observed that there is a correlation between sales activity and house prices, but 
our results suggest that after controlling for other influences on house prices, 
current sales activity has no additional explanatory power. Instead, sales activity 
influences house prices with a two-quarter lag. The significant positive value for 
this coefficient is contrary to short-run market efficiency. A reasonable 
interpretation is that prospective buyers see housing activity lift, decide to embark 
on house purchase/sale; there is then a four- to six-month lag between their 
observing the housing market activity and their actual market involvement. This 
behaviour significantly affects the dynamics of house prices. 
The final variable in the equation, COMPzt, is highly significant, 
indicating that the composition of houses sold within a quarter affects the median 
price observed within a region that quarter. Thus adjusting for this effect is 
important given the sales data that we have. The significant positive coefficient on 
COMPzt is not an indicator of market inefficiency. 
We have run a number of checks on the robustness of the parameters 
reported in column (1). Column (2) of Table 4 estimates the same equation using 
SUR, using the SUR long-run specification (with UC2) from Table 3. There is 
little change to any of the coefficients or to the explanatory power of the equation.  
21 Tests of the residuals from the OLS equation in Table 4 indicate the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. In column (3), we present 
estimates with panel-corrected standard errors using the Prais-Winsten (PW) 
method;
25 in column (4) we present generalised least squares (GLS) estimates.
26 
In each case, there is little difference in coefficient estimates. 
4.3 Dynamic  results:  Asymmetric 
The potential for asymmetric adjustment was discussed in relation to 
(8). Estimates of asymmetric adjustment may be particularly useful in exposing 
the circumstances contributing to the short-run inefficiency found above; for 
instance, adjustment may be less consistent with market efficiency when the 
market is either above or below equilibrium. 
In order to investigate the potential for asymmetric adjustment, we re-
estimate column (1) in Table 4, with a dummy term (equal to one when the lagged 
residual is positive and zero otherwise) that is interacted with each of the variables 
in the equation. This allows us to estimate separate coefficients on each variable 
depending on whether the lagged residuals are positive (prices above equilibrium) 
or negative. The results of estimating this asymmetric adjustment process, using 
OLS, are shown as column (5) in Table 4.
27
Several features stand out in these results. First, adjustment to lagged 
disequilibrium is estimated to be very much faster than in the symmetric case. The 
estimated coefficient is almost identical across negative and positive residuals; we 
cannot reject identical coefficients at the 5% significance level. In each case, 
however, the coefficient is still significantly different from –1. 
                                                           
25 In the Prais-Winsten regression the disturbances are assumed to be panel-level heteroskedastic 
in the presence of first-order autocorrelation where the coefficient of the AR(1) process is specific 
to each panel. 
26 The GLS estimates allow for a heteroskedastic error structure with AR(1) autocorrelation 
specific to each panel. The adjusted R
2 and s.e. are not available for this option. 
27 SUR estimates provide almost identical results and so are not presented here. 
22 Second, house prices adjust symmetrically to contemporaneous 
economic activity developments (statistically, we cannot reject symmetry). The 
estimated speed of adjustment to economic activity developments is materially 
stronger than in the symmetric case, and now represents approximately 80% of the 
estimated long-run response. The upper end of the 95% confidence interval in 
each case (1.11 and 1.07 with negative and positive residuals respectively) falls 
just short of the estimated long-run parameter. 
Third, additions to the housing stock have a highly asymmetric effect 
on prices. In a depressed housing market, i.e. when house prices are below 
equilibrium (negative residual), additions to the housing stock have no effect on 
the price; the softening effect of new housing stock on house prices is felt only at 
times when the market is buoyant (prices above equilibrium). It is likely that the 
house stock expands principally in buoyant rather than depressed times. Thus in 
depressed times there is little explanatory power of housing stock changes on 
price (hence the parameter estimate which is not significantly different from zero). 
The price response to house additions in buoyant times is not significantly 
different from the estimated long-run response. 
Fourth, the response of house prices to user cost changes is estimated to 
be virtually identical in buoyant and depressed conditions. The estimate is 
considerably higher than in the equation where symmetry is imposed on all 
coefficients and now represents almost 75% of the estimated long-run response. 
As in the economic activity case, however, the upper end of the 95% confidence 
interval falls just short of the estimated long-run parameter. 
Fifth, consumer price inflation is estimated to be fully incorporated into 
house prices contemporaneously under buoyant market conditions; under 
depressed market conditions only three-quarters of consumer price inflation is 
contemporaneously embodied in prices. Symmetry in this respect can be rejected 
at the 5% level. 
23 Sixth, the effect of lagged sales activity is also highly asymmetric. 
When the housing market is depressed, a rise in sales activity boosts prices, 
whereas in a buoyant market, a rise in sales activity has no statistically significant 
effect on house prices. This result is important for interpreting the role of sales in 
creating, or adjusting to, fads. A reasonable interpretation is that buyers and 
sellers are aware of market conditions in a buoyant market situation. In a 
depressed market people may hold off house purchase (for whatever reasons) but 
once people see the housing market starting to move (by observing increased 
sales) they enter the market intending to purchase a house prior to prices reverting 
to equilibrium. In this case, the sales variable can be considered an equilibrating 
factor by speeding the return of prices towards fundamental values within a 
depressed market situation. Nevertheless, even though it may be an equilibrating 
factor in this respect, its statistical significance is still indicative of the presence of 
short-run inefficiency at times in the housing market. 
Finally, the explanatory power of the equation is considerably higher 
than in the symmetric case. The equation standard error falls by 27% and the 
Adjusted R
2 more than doubles with the asymmetric estimates relative to the 
symmetric case. This material change in explanatory power indicates that 
significant asymmetries in the adjustment process exist. When the asymmetric 
equation is estimated as two separate equations (split according to the sign of the 
residuals), the explanatory power is almost identical across depressed and buoyant 
market conditions (with an s.e. of 0.0267 and 0.0265 respectively). Thus house 
price changes are equally explicable in depressed and buoyant conditions, but 
material differences are found in the role of some variables, especially housing 
stock changes, consumer price inflation and sales activity. A comparison of 
column (1) and column (5) in Table 4 indicates that the linear model needs to 
incorporate asymmetric adjustment. (5) is therefore our preferred short-run, linear 
equation. 
24 4.4 Dynamic  results:  Non-linear 
The short-run estimates have hitherto constrained the dynamics to be 
linear (albeit asymmetric). They have so far ignored the potential for non-linear 
adjustment embodied in coefficients b2Az and b3Az in (8). The significance of the 
sales variable in the previous dynamic specifications suggests it is particularly 
important to investigate potential non-linearities associated with improved 
information dissemination arising from increased sales activity. We do so initially 
based on the symmetric specification reported as column (1) in Table 4, and then 
with asymmetries. In each case, we ignore the role of b3Az since we detect no 
significant role for lagged price changes in the adjustment process. 
In implementing (8) we must decide whether to set Ā as the national 
mean of the housing market activity variable or as the regional mean, the latter 
varying across regions. It is possible, for instance, that information dissemination 
may be region-specific, in which case the latter variable will be more relevant, but 
if information dissemination is nationwide the national mean is relevant.  
We estimate both regional and national versions of (8). In each case, we 
use the sales variable, Szt, for our measure of housing market activity. The results 
from using the national and regional means are almost identical and there is little 
to choose statistically between specifications. Coefficients on each of the variables 
within the equation (including the lagged sales variable) are hardly altered by the 
alternative measures. The interaction term (b2Az) is statistically significant in each 
specification ("t-values" for the national specification are 3.36 and 3.58 for OLS 
and SUR respectively; and for the regional specification they are 2.92 and 2.68 
respectively).  
The b2Az coefficient in each case is positive, implying that a higher sales 
ratio leads to slower adjustment to disequilibrium. The effect, however, is small. 
A 10% increase in Szt is estimated to alter the adjustment term on the residual 
from –0.414 to –0.379, implying little material shift in adjustment to 
disequilibrium. (This estimate is based on the OLS national specification; other 
specifications are similar.) 
25 The direction of this result contrasts with the information-based reason 
put forward by Capozza et al for including the interaction term, since higher sales 
activity should improve information dissemination, therefore leading to faster 
adjustment to disequilibrium. An alternative explanation, consistent with the 
results here, is that high current sales activity has some fad element associated 
with it. For instance, in a buoyant market, high sales activity may delay 
adjustment back to fundamentals when price is above equilibrium. 
We shed light on this potential explanation by re-estimating (8), using 
the national mean, with asymmetric adjustment depending on whether lagged 
residuals are positive or negative. We find that the interaction term is not 
statistically significant when the market is depressed but is just significant (at the 
10% level in each of the OLS and SUR approaches) in a buoyant market. This 
result suggests that high sales activity has a slight delaying effect on adjustment to 
fundamentals in a buoyant market. Again, however, the effect is not material in an 
economic sense (a 10% increase in Szt in a buoyant market reduces the adjustment 
term on the residual from –0.697 to –0.673). Given the lack of materiality of the 
non-linear adjustment process—both symmetric and asymmetric—our 
interpretation of results henceforth concentrates on the linear asymmetric results, 
i.e. column (5) of Table 4. 
5 Interpretation 
To interpret our results and to apply them to recent housing market 
experience internationally, we examine the potential for overshooting or other fad-
like (bubble) phenomena to arise consistent with our estimates. Taking the long-
run (Table 3) and dynamic asymmetric OLS estimates (column 5 in Table 4) as 
our starting points, we trace out the dynamic effect of a realistic change to real 
economic activity on the real median house price. Initially we hold all other 
factors constant (i.e. we do not consider any flow-on effects to sales activity, etc) 
other than expectations which follow the extrapolative form estimated (within 
UC2) in the long-run equation. Subsequently, we examine the effect of 
interactions with house sales. 
26 The economic activity change that we consider is based on actual 
aggregate US GDP experience since 1985.
28 In the decade to 1995q2, real GDP 
grew at an average rate of 0.72% per quarter (p.q.). Over the following five years 
(to 2000q2) the average growth rate was 1.05% p.q.; in the following two years 
(to 2002q2) average growth fell to 0.25% p.a. We take, as our baseline, a GDP 
(economic activity) growth rate of 0.72% p.q. and calculate the real house price 
corresponding to this track, holding other variables constant. We then compare the 
house price arising from a "shocked" GDP track and express this latter track as a 
percentage of baseline. The shocked track that we compare is one that historically 
grows at 0.72% p.q.; then (from quarter 1) experiences growth of 1.05% p.q. for 
20 quarters, then 0.25% p.q. growth for the following 8 quarters, thereafter 
returning to 0.72% quarterly growth.
29
Figure 1 graphs the resulting real house price path expressed as a 
percentage of baseline. The GDP track results in the long-run level of GDP in the 
shocked case settling 2.9% higher than baseline. This has the effect of raising 
long-run real house prices by 3.4% relative to baseline. In the interim, however, 
house prices rise to a peak at 8.2% above baseline (after 20 quarters) before 
dropping to 3.1% above baseline (after 35 quarters), thence returning to the long-
run value. 
In part, this behaviour is driven by the faster then slower path for GDP 
growth. But it is also affected by the expectations adjustment mechanism that 
feeds into the user cost variable. This mechanism can be seen from Figure 2. This 
figure graphs the real house price path consequent on a permanent 1% innovation 
to economic activity. The long-run house price effect of the activity increase is 
1.17%; the contemporaneous effect is 0.89%. The initial house price increase 
feeds into real capital gains expectations via the UC variable so that UC falls 
consequent to the house price rise. 
                                                           
28 US GDP data underlying these calculations is sourced from Bureau of Economic Analysis, US 
Department of Commerce. 
29 While this period involves quite a stark cycle for the US, we note that individual regional 
economies, as discussed by Case and Shiller (2003), have undergone considerably larger economic 
activity cycles with the potential for considerably magnified housing cycles relative to the 
aggregate experience. 
27 The fall in UC is magnified as the house price rise continues, and this 
fall contributes to a further rise in the house price. The combined effect of this 
process and the direct effect of regional activity on house prices is to cause an 
overshooting of house prices above the long-run equilibrium. At some point, the 
positive residual created through house prices being above equilibrium exerts 
downward price pressure, equilibrating the market. A damped cycle results, as 
depicted in Figure 2. The peak of the cycle occurs in the 13
th quarter, with a price 
rise (above baseline) of 1.24%. The trough occurs in the 26
th quarter, just below 
the long-run value. 
Endogenous sales activity is a factor which may make for additional 
complexity in the dynamics. Sales activity may respond to the price dynamics, i.e. 
to the change in prices and/or to the disequilibrium in prices. If that is the case, the 
presence of a significant sales effect in the dynamic price equation will affect the 
price path in response to a shock. To illustrate the effect of sales, we estimate a 
simple equation for Szt as a function of current and lagged changes in real house 
prices (∆Pzt–i) and the lagged residual from the long-run house price equation 
(RESzt–1). Coefficients on these terms are restricted across regions, but constant 
and quadratic time trend terms are included and vary across regions to allow for 
region-specific fixed and trend effects. Estimates are presented in Table 5. 
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that sales activity increases with 
current and lagged (real) price rises. The effect is strongest as a result of one 
quarter lagged price changes, with a decreasing effect thereafter, up to five 
quarters. This effect may contribute to a disequilibrating dynamic given that 
lagged sales in turn positively affect price changes. However, sales activity is also 
estimated to decrease as prices rise beyond their long-run value via the negative 
coefficient on the residual term. This has an equilibrating effect on the market 
given the lagged sales effect on prices. 
Combining the dynamic equation for sales with the long-run and 
dynamic (asymmetric) price estimates, we calculate the price effect of an activity 
rise allowing for the interaction of direct price effects, the UC effect and the sales 
effect. 
28 In the case of a 1% permanent increase in economic activity, there is a 
slightly greater degree of price overshooting than observed previously (with 
exogenous sales activity). The speed of the overshooting occurs considerably 
faster, with the peak being reached in the fourth quarter. (Apart from the speed of 
the overshooting, the other properties of the cycle remain similar to those shown 
in Figure 2 and so are not reproduced here.) 
In response to a permanent 1% reduction in activity, a much slower 
cycle is exhibited with endogenous sales, with the trough in prices occurring in 
the ninth quarter. The reason for this asymmetry is the asymmetric adjustment of 
prices to sales. With a positive shock, the contemporaneous price rise is initially 
less than the long-run rise, resulting in a negative residual. The negative residual 
in turn causes a sales rise in excess of that driven by the initial price change, and 
the compound rise in sales further boosts prices (with a two-quarter lag) 
contributing to the speed of the overshooting. By contrast, a negative shock results 
in a positive residual (as prices initially fall less than the long-run fall) but in this 
case there is no material price response to sales because of the asymmetric effect 
of sales on price dynamics. Thus the effect of the shock takes longer to feed 
through to prices and overshooting occurs more gradually. This asymmetry 
mirrors the findings of Genesove and Mayer's (2001) "reluctant-seller" case 
whereby a negative localised shock leads to slower house price adjustment to 
equilibrium than is the case with a positive shock. 
Overall, our estimates indicate that realistic changes in the path of 
economic activity can have a material effect on house prices, causing prices to 
overshoot their long-run equilibrium. Both extrapolative expectations effects and 
sales dynamics are shown to impact on the cycles that emerge from changes to 
underlying economic factors, while asymmetries in adjustment may be material. 
29 6 Conclusions 
Consistent with our theoretical model based on consumer optimisation 
conditions, regional real house prices converge to a long-run equilibrium 
determined by regional economic activity, the regional housing stock and the user 
cost of capital. Trend variables, reflecting trends in housing services and amenity 
values, have a significant impact in eleven of the fourteen regions. 
In contrast with the long-run results, the strict conditions for short-run 
efficiency are not met. House prices respond to contemporaneous shocks in the 
directions expected and respond significantly to lagged disequilibrium in prices. 
However, adjustment is not fully completed within one quarter either to 
contemporaneous shocks or to lagged disequilibrium. Adjustment is symmetric in 
response to lagged disequilibrium and to contemporaneous shocks to economic 
activity and to the user cost of capital, but is asymmetric in response to consumer 
price changes. Further, house prices respond positively to past house sales 
activity, but only in depressed market conditions (when prices are below 
equilibrium). 
The presence of a significant positive sales effect would normally be 
considered to contribute to price overshooting following a shock to fundamentals 
(for example, to economic activity). This is especially the case when sales activity 
is itself a positive function of past house price changes, as indeed we find. In the 
case of our estimates, however, the sales effect is an equilibrating influence, only 
driving prices upwards (towards equilibrium) when prices are below their 
equilibrium levels. When prices exceed equilibrium, the sales effect is absent. 
Our estimates indicate that extrapolative house price expectations, 
based on medium-term regional price trends, provide the best explanation 
(amongst the expectations proxies we examined) of house price developments 
when incorporated into the user cost of capital measure. Our simulations of house 
price responses to economic activity shocks demonstrate that this expectations 
process induces some mild overshooting of house prices following an economic 
activity shock. These results are consistent with the survey-based findings of Case 
and Shiller (2003). 
30 The length of the cycle depends on whether the activity shock is 
positive or negative (the latter having the longer cycle), reflecting the asymmetric 
influence of house sales activity on real house prices. The latter effect is 
consistent with sellers being reluctant to sell their houses when equilibrium prices 
have fallen following a negative economic shock. 
Although our results reject short-run efficiency, heuristically the degree 
of housing market inefficiency appears small. Approximately three-quarters of 
lagged disequilibrium disappears within three months. A similar fraction of the 
long-run price effects from economic activity and user cost of capital shocks are 
reflected contemporaneously in house prices. Three-quarters of consumer price 
changes are reflected contemporaneously in house prices in depressed market 
conditions and the full effect of consumer price changes is contemporaneously 
impounded in house prices in buoyant conditions. Nevertheless, our estimates 
indicate that adjustment to equilibrium is characterised by asymmetries and some 
degree of overshooting. Thus the housing market, while being "moderately 
efficient", retains the capability for delivering surprising and potentially 
destabilising episodes. 






























RC01 157  46  568  140,133 10.1  105 
RC02 282  111  5349  1,158,891  206.9  98 
RC03 166  61  1658  357,726 14.0  92 
RC04 168  38  1270  239,412 19.2  84 
RC05 100  2  168  43,974  5.3  32 
RC06 142  32  616  142,947 10.1  64 
RC07 106  12  524  102,858 14.1  73 
RC08 98  12  1191  220,089 9.9  51 
RC09 203  87  2206  423,765 52.2  77 
RC11 162  46  669  122,475 5.4  97 
RC12 63  24  173  30,303  1.3  62 
RC13 146  58  2727  481,431 10.6  99 
RC14 117  38  1158  181,542 5.7  59 
RC15 66  –27  578  91,002  2.6  46 
*Expressed in $NZ. On average, over 2002, NZ$1 = US$0.46. 
 
 
Table 2:  Results of panel unit root tests 
 Levin-Lin-Chu  Im-Pesaran-Shin 
Variable Trend  and 
constant 
Constant Trend  and 
constant 
Constant 
Pz I(0)/I(1) I(0)/I(1) I(0)/I(1) I(0)/I(1) 
Yz I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Sz I(0)/I(1) I(0)/I(1)  I(0)  I(0) 
Hz I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
UC2z I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) 
UC3z I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
COMPz I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
 
32 Table 3:  Long-run house price estimates 
  UC1 UC2 UC3 UC4 




































































0.9979 0.9729 0.9980  0.9780 0.9974 0.9724 0.9979 0.9706 
s.e.  0.0542 0.0545 0.0485  0.0491 0.0544 0.0550 0.0560 0.0567 
Obs  1,232 1,232 1,232  1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 
All equations are estimated over 1981(1)–2002(4). Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
Each equation has unrestricted constants, TIME and TIME
2, included but not reported. 
The dependent variable is the log of real house prices (Pzt), where z denotes region,and t denotes 
time. 
Yzt is the log of real regional economic activity. 
Hzt is the log of housing stock. 
UCzt is the user cost of capital [definitions as in the text, entered only from 1985(1) onwards]. 
UCDt is a dummy variable equal to 1 to 1984(4) and equal to 0 thereafter to account for the 
regulated financial system. 
















-ve RESt-1       +ve RESt-1
RESzt–1 -0.4326*** -0.4255*** -0.4681*** -0.4507*** -0.7473*** -0.7196*** 
  (18.73) (18.66) (16.22) (19.64) (27.34) (26.41) 
∆Yzt 0.6320*** 0.5682*** 0.5925*** 0.5211*** 0.9293*** 0.8949*** 
  (7.16) (6.43) (6.45) (6.73) (9.94) (9.77) 
∆Hzt -0.7900***  -0.6266** -0.7202** -0.6298** 0.2383  -0.8109*** 
  (2.70) (2.14) (2.43) (2.38) (0.79) (2.66) 
∆UC2zt -0.0017** -0.0017** -0.0016** -0.0017*** -0.0057*** -0.0056*** 
  (2.36) (2.45) (2.20) (2.86) (6.83) (8.04) 
COMPzt 0.1490*** 0.1436*** 0.1673*** 0.1464*** 0.1184*** 0.0827*** 
  (8.40) (8.11) (8.02) (8.59) (5.87) (4.85) 
Szt–2 1.2656*** 1.2765*** 1.1701*** 1.0693*** 1.3476*** 0.0652 
  (5.78) (5.83) (4.84) (5.31) (5.85) (0.29) 
∆PCt -0.4941*** -0.4787*** -0.5366*** -0.5409*** -0.2645*** 0.0138 
  (6.02) (5.82) (6.29) (7.53) (3.28) (0.14) 
Obs.  1204 1204 1204 1204  1204 
Adj. R
2 0.3057 0.3046 0.3251   0.6337 
s.e.  0.0366 0.0366 0.0361   0.0266 
The dependent variable is the log change in real house prices (∆Pzt), where z denotes region, t 
denotes time. 
RESzt–1 is the lagged long-run house price residual from Table 3. 
∆Yzt is the log change in real regional economic activity. 
∆Hzt is the log change in housing stock. 
UC2zt is change in user cost of capital (the second proxy for ġ in the text). 
COMPzt is a housing stock composition variable. 
Szt–2 is house sales to housing stock ratio lagged two quarters. 
∆PCt is the log change in consumer prices. 
An unrestricted constant term is included but not reported. 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
34 Table 5:  Sales (Szt) response to house price developments 

















The dependent variable is house sales to housing stock ratio (Szt) where z denotes region, t denotes 
time. 
RESz–-1 is the lagged long-run house price residual from Table 3 column (1). 
∆Pzt is the log change in real house price. 
Unrestricted constants TIME and TIME
2 included but not reported. 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses; *** indicates significant at 1%. 
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